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DICTA

CASE COMMENTS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -

EMINENT DOMAIN

The Denver City Council enacted an ordinance ' which granted
to the State Department of Highways the right to construct and
maintain a highway, extending along the eastern section of City
Park. Petitioner, a citizen of the city and abutting property owner,
alleged that the proposed grant of park land was void since it
violated the state constitution and the City Charter. It was proposed
that such land was held in trust, dedicated to use of the public;
therefore, the city, acting as trustee, was powerless to convey this
property unless the state should institute condemnation proceedings.
The court affirmed a judgement declaring the proceedings to be a
"useless act" because both the City Council and the Department of
Highways had previously agreed upon adequate compensation and
damages to be paid for the land. Welch v. City and County of Denver, 349 P. 2d 352 (Colo. 1960).
It was established in McIntyre v. Board of County Commissioners of El Paso County2 that land dedicated to public use as a public
park cannot be conveyed away or alienated to a use inconsistent
with that of its dedication. In that case the city attempted to convey
a section of public park land to the county for erection of a courthouse. It was held that the city, as trustee, had no authority for such
conveyance. 3 The court further stated that if land is dedicated for a
park, the citizens, beneficiaries of the trust, are entitled to use of the
whole. If trustees are permitted to say that a particular section is
not needed or necessary for the dedicated purpose, then it follows
that the larger portion of it is not
so needed; thus, the entire pur4
pose of the dedication is defeated.
The charter of Denver provides that no section of any park land
belonging to or acquired by the City and County of Denver shall be
sold or leased at any time. 5 The Colorado Constitution states that the
people of the City and County of Denver are vested with exclusive6
power in making, altering, revising or amending their charter.
Numerous state courts have repeatedly held that a municipality,
standing as trustee to property dedicated to public use, may not
convey such property to a use completely inconsistent 7with limitations arising out of the trust or dedication agreement.
Granted, the state's power to acquire, by condemnation or otherwise, lands of municipal corporations has been delegated to the Department of Highways. 8 However, the "or otherwise" clause does
not constitute an absolute power.9 Upon dismissing a petition to
1 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code 1 302 (1958), provides in pertinent part: " ...
the Council
of the City and County of Denver hereby gives and grants unto the Department of Highways . . .
the right and privilege to construct and maintain a street and highway in the following described
real property . . . in connection with and as a part of the improvement . . . of State Highway No.
153 and Ho. 2 which pass throuah the City and County of Denver."
2 15 Colo. App. 78, 61 Pac. 237 (1900).
3 Id. at 85.
4 Id. at 85-86.
5 Colo. Const. art. XX. 0 5 as amended by Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code 1 84 (5) (1955).
6 Colo. Const. art. XX, 1 5 (1950).
7 Village of Riverside v. Maclean, 210 II. 308, 71 N.E. 408 (1904); Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 361
(1871); Boston and Albany Railroad Co., 53 N.Y. 574 (1873); Zachry v. City of Son Antonio, 157 Tex.
551, 305 S.W.2d 558 (1957); Rayor v. City of Cheyenne, 63 Wyo. 72, 178 P.2d 115 (1947).
8 Colo. Rev. Stat. if 120-3-17, 120-13-35(11) (1953).
9 Town of Eaton v. Bouslog. 133 Colo. 130, 292 P.2d 343 (1956).
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condemn land for cemetery purposes in Town of Eaton v. Bauslog,10
the court stated that municipalities are permitted by statute 1 to
establish and regulate cemeteries, and acquire land therefore by
purchase or otherwise. But it cannot be implied from the word
"otherwise" that the town has authority to condemn land for such
the
purpose. If it can be said that use of this word
12 creates a doubt,
power of condemnation has not been granted.
Petitioners in Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora13 sought
to condemn land used as a public cemetery for the purpose of expanding reservoir facilities. The court stated that vague or doubtful
language found in statutes must be excluded. 14 The power is withheld unless it is specifically and unequivocally granted.1 5 Of course,
authorities unanimously affirm the proposition that the state may
condemn any land which it deems necessary and proper, 6 and such
action will not be questioned
unless it is fraudulent or no actual
17
public need existed.
Authorities in other jurisdictions tend to strengthen petitioner's
argument in the instant case. United States v. Carmack's questioned
whether the Federal Works Administration was authorized to acquire land held in trust by the town for its inhabitants and used for
such public purposes as a local park, courthouse, city hall and public
library. The Court allowed voluntary conveyance of whatever title
the city was able to convey. However, the Court took notice of restrictions in the conveyance, arising out of the trust relationship, and
permitted all claimants to any interest through the grantors of the
disputed site to be joined as defendants. 19 Thus, a decree of condemnation disposed of the suggested defects and provided a judicial process for securing better title than may be obtained solely by voluntary conveyance.20
The majority of the court in the Welch case pointed out that a
successful agreement concerning adequate compensation and damages was reached. They held that this satisfied the required condition precedent to an institution of eminent domain proceedings namely, that such agreement be attempted. 2 1 Further, the court
reasoned, if a compromise was obtained, why should the state be
compelled to institute condemnation proceedings?
It appears that the trust relationship existing between the city
and petitioner was entirely discarded. This conveyance deprived the
petitioner, as a beneficiary of the park's dedication, of her rights
22
which are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
10 Ibid.
II Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-32-1(32) (1953).
12 Town of Eaton v. Bouslog, supro at 132.
13 126 Colo. 267, 248 P.2d 732 (1952).
14 Id. at 272.
15 Ibid.
16 Burns v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n., 325 Moss. 731, 92 N.E.2d 391 (1950).
17 Jennings v. Bd. of Comm'ns. of Montrose County, 85 Colo. 498, 277 Pac. 467 (1929); Alabama
Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 606 (1922); Carstens v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Lincoln
County, 111 P.2d 583 (1941).
18 329 U.S. 230 (1946).
19 Id. at 239.
20 Ibid.
21 Accord, Stalford v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Prowers County, 128 Colo. 441, 263 P.2d 436
(1953); Old Timers' Baseball Ass'n v. Housing Authority of Denver, 122 Colo. 597, 224 P.2d 219
(1950); Mulford v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co., 62 Colo. 167, 161 Pac. 301 (1916).
-1 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in pertinent part: " . . . nor shall any state deprive
any peron of life, lib'rtv or oropertv without due process of low, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of 'he laws."
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Eustace v. Dickey2 3 and In re Fulton's WillJ 2 4 are just two examples
of the recognized principle that a trustee has a duty to administer
the trust solely in the beneficiary's interest and may not change the
scope of the purposes25for which such property is held without the
beneficiary's consent.
Thus, it seems that the Welch case is a novel and radical decision in Colorado. It is submitted that the court went beyond its
limitations in approving the city's action. The ordinance 26 granting
park land to the Department of Highways obviously amounted to a
sale. There was an exchange of an interest in the land for damages
paid to the city. Since the court evidently interpreted this transaction as constituting an easement, it is apparent that this was an
"evasive device" to by-pass provisions of the state constitution.
Although the state, exercising its sovereign rights, may condemn such land, its approach in this instance was without precedent.
Petitioner proved her interest in contesting the action, yet she was
not even allowed to voice her disapproval in a court of law. Further
application of this view to similar areas of the law will substantially
minimize individual rights as quaranteed
by the Constitutions of the
28
United States2 7 and of Colorado.
-M.

NEAL SINGER

23 240 Mass. 55, 132 N.E. 852 (1921).
24 2 N.Y.S.2d 917, 253 App. Div. 494 (1938).
25 Rottger v. First-Merchants' Not. Bank of Lafayette, 98 Ind. App. 139, 184 N.E. 267 (1933).
26 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code § 302 (1958).
27 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
28 Colo. Const. art. XX, § 5 (1950).
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